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English. The central concern of the humanities is the understanding of human artifacts. This
goal requires interpretation and makes hermeneutics a core element of their methodology. So
far, the digital humanities have been mostly concerned with providing tools that either support
human interpretation or that permit scholars to record results of their interpretation through
annotation. However, if we understand digital humanities as the construction of formal models in
the humanities, we must also strive to integrate hermeneutics into these models. In this paper, we
reflect on the role of hermeneutics in digital humanities and sketch an approach for combining
human interpretation with formal models.
Italiano. La preoccupazione centrale delle scienze umane è la comprensione dei artefat-
ti umani. Questo obiettivo richiede interpretazione e fa dell’ermeneutica un elemento centrale
della loro metodologia. L’informatica umanistica si è finora occupata soprattutto di fornire
strumenti che supportano l’interpretazione umana o che permettono agli studiosi di registrare i
risultati della loro interpretazione attraverso l’annotazione. Tuttavia, se intendiamo l’informatica
umanistica come la costruzione di modelli formali nelle scienze umane, dobbiamo anche cercare
di integrare l’ermeneutica in questi modelli. In questo lavoro riflettiamo sul ruolo dell’ermeneutica
nell’informatica umanistica e tracciamo un approccio per combinare l’interpretazione umana con i
modelli formali.
1 Introduction: The Theoretical DH
The interpretation of human artifacts in order to understand their “meaning” is the central concern of the
humanities. They are therefore often characterized as being “qualitative-hermeneutical,” in contrast to the
natural sciences and to computer science, which are supposedly “empirical,” “quantitative,” and much
less dependent on interpretation. However, as Piotrowski (2018) argues, disciplines are not defined by
their methods alone but rather by a “unique combination” of a research object and a research objective;
research methods, he notes, are “secondary in that they are contingent on the research object and the
research objective.” In addition, technical and scientific progress not only enables methods to evolve, but
also requires them to adapt, while research objects and objectives largely remain stable. Even though
particular methods may be “typical” for a particular discipline, all disciplines can, in principle, use any
methods, including computational ones, as long as they fit their research objectives. As Orlandi puts it,
“un po’ di aritmetica ha sempre fatto parte delle discipline umanistiche” (Orlandi, 1990, 114). Conversely,
other fields also use methods commonly associated with the humanities. For example, Frodeman (1995)
has argued that geology is really a “historical and interpretive science,” rather than a “derivative science,
relying on the logical techniques exemplified by physics” (see also Comet, 1996). Similarly, artificial
intelligence (e.g., Winograd, 1981) and computer science more generally (e.g., West, 1997) attempted to
formalize and apply the key concept of hermeneutics, namely, understanding.
The research carried out under the heading of “Digital Humanities” (DH) currently tends to focus on
quantitative analyses, which have long been difficult or even impossible in the humanities and which
yield important new insights complementing traditional (“manual”) qualitative analyses. However, if we
understand DH as the construction of formal models in the humanities (Piotrowski, 2018; McCarty, 2014;
Orlandi, 1990), we must not neglect the qualitative-hermeneutic dimension. If the humanities want to
succeed in answering their research questions—which are primarily qualitative in nature—they cannot
rely on quantitative methods alone. Instead, a multilayered research process is required, one in which
quantitative and qualitative analyses continuously alternate.
One of the main challenges for the theoretical digital humanities (Piotrowski, 2018) remains to find
ways to integrate hermeneutic methods and insights into formal models, rather than keeping interpretation
detached, as a kind of afterthought to automatic analyses (or vice versa). In this regard, there are noteworthy
initiatives to exploit the computer as a “modeling machine” (McCarty, 2014, 256) while continuing the
long philosophical tradition of hermeneutics (e.g., Dilthey, Heidegger, Gadamer, Ricœur, Iser, Jauss etc.).
However, there does not seem to be a transfer back in the other direction. The goal of this paper is thus
to outline the prospects for a novel approach that might be called computational hermeneutics and to
stimulate a wide discussion on the possibility of a unified science bridging the gap between the humanities
and the sciences.
2 Hermeneutics and Understanding
The main goal of any hermeneutic approach is to achieve what Dilthey called Verstehen, an “understanding”
of human artifacts in order to answer questions about the “Why?” and “How?” and to uncover underlying
patterns (Bod, 2015). But what exactly is understanding, and the understanding of what? One may argue
that hermeneutic interpretation aims at uncovering the meaning of a given text by reference to the author’s
intention (whether empirical or idealized), the envisaged reader, and the dense web of meanings invoked
by the text. Understanding thus involves a reconstruction of (a) the reasons why a given author (or group
of authors) produced a particular text (text understood in a broad sense), (b) the overt or hidden layers
of meaning of a given text, (c) the type of recipient envisaged by the author and/or the text, and (d) the
potentially infinite number of contexts in which the reconstruction of meaning can take place (Ricœur’s
“conflit des interprétations”).
Whenever we interpret language, we need to rely on some pre-understanding that provides the basis on
which to build an interpretation. It is thus a recursive process, in which (pre-)understanding is necessary
for interpretation, which in turn produces understanding, and so forth—hence the term hermeneutic circle
(for an illuminating discussion see Göttner (1973)). Since this process leads to a progressive approximation
to an (ideally exhaustive) understanding of a given text, Bolten (1985) has proposed the more apt metaphor
of a hermeneutic spiral.
Despite the supposed “death of the author” (as famously heralded by Roland Barthes), authorial intention
remains an important component of pre-understanding: the interpretation of texts cannot be successful
when one just relies on lexical meanings and sentence semantics alone, both of which may not even be
available when we understand texts in a broad sense. For an interpretation to be sound, one has to make
complex inferences that rely on vast knowledge about the world and on the attribution of mental states
(especially intentions) to the author. Here Grice’s conversational maxims play a particularly important
role in guiding the inferential process. It is characteristic of the ways in which hermeneutics is commonly
construed that these inferential processes about the other mind, however foreign, are rarely reflected in
depth (see Winograd’s model of the speaker as part of the reader’s model of the world (Winograd, 1981)).
Nonetheless, despite the importance of authorial intention, it is necessary to draw a distinction between
the meaning of a text and the meaning as intended by the (empirical rather than ideal) author. In other
words, the meaning of a text cannot be reduced to the intended meaning either.
3 Hermeneutics and Digital Humanities
There are essentially two “native” strands of interpretation in DH, which both now have long traditions




Figure 1 – Hermeneutics considers a work in a particular context of interpretation, peculiar to a reader,
here modeled as a network of concepts. Links between concepts can be of various types; they can be
thought of as mental associations.
One strand is that of annotation, exemplified by the Text Encoding Initiative (TEI, 1987).1 It goes
back to an even longer editorial tradition in philology, focusing primarily (though not exclusively) on a
single text and the textual phenomena therein. It is thus a relatively “weak” form of interpretation, in
the sense that it makes only limited connections to the extra-textual (which for Ricœur (2017, 103) is a
defining feature of interpretation)—but intentionally so: editions are generally used as a basis for a later
interpretation of the text.
The other strand, which Rockwell and Sinclair (2016) call “computer-assisted interpretation,” builds
on an equally long-standing tradition in literary studies, in particular concordancing, stylometry, and
other quantitative analyses, and belongs to the first applications of computers in the humanities (see, e.g.,
Kroeber, 1967). The modern evolution of this strand can be exemplified by Rockwell and Sinclair (2016)
and their work on Voyant.2 This strand is oriented towards tools and automatic analyses informing human
interpretation. Rockwell and Sinclair’s notion of the “hybrid essay, an interpretive work embedded with
hermeneutical toys” (Rockwell and Sinclair, 2016, 17) illustrates well the idea of the computer providing
scholars with new evidence.
Both strands are not limited to philology and literary studies; they can also be found in other humanities
disciplines, and images or other artifacts may replace texts as research objects. Outside of DH, computer-
assisted interpretation (in the above sense) remains controversial (see, e.g., the debates following the
publication of Da, 2019); critics typically question the legitimacy of quantitative methods in general.
However, both annotation and computer-assisted interpretation have an inherent limitation in common,
which is rarely, if ever, discussed: human interpretation remains outside of the formal framework. In the
case of annotation, the (formal) annotation is the result of a preceding human interpretation that motivates
a particular annotation (say, that tagging of some text as “deleted”), but only the result (in the form of a
<del> tag) is formally documented, the reasoning for this choice generally remains inaccessible, at least to
the computer. Furthermore, it is usually difficult, or even (practically) impossible, to record alternative
interpretations.
4 Proposal
How, then, could we link hermeneutics to formal models, so that human interpretations can be taken into
account as well and different types of methods can be combined to truly complement each other? The idea
of mixed methods, which originated in the social sciences (Kuckartz, 2014), certainly cannot be transferred
to the domain of the humanities without modification. It is important to stress that the goal cannot be to
“automate” interpretation; the bedrock of Verstehen is a shared understanding of the conditio humana.
1https://tei-c.org
2https://voyant-tools.org
The goal must rather be to support the scholar by making it possible, for example, to process qualitative
human interpretations alongside the results of automatic quantitative analyses.
The basic idea of our proposal is to model the context of interpretation—i.e., a reader’s knowledge of
cultural concepts and the associations between them—as a semantic network or knowledge graph (see
Fig. 1), and interpretation as the linking of features of the interpreted object to nodes of this network,
i.e., the construction of a new network, as illustrated in Fig. 2. Understanding can thus be defined as the
integration of the object’s properties into a preexisting network.
Computationally, this model can be represented using Semantic Web and Linked Data technologies,
which has the advantage that existing tools and methods can be leveraged. In particular, we propose
to use nanopublications, a knowledge representation approach originally developed in bioinformatics
(Groth et al., 2010), although the conceptual model is neutral with respect to a particular implementation.
Nanopublications were developed as a common framework for describing scientific statements together
with contexts (e.g., original publication, authors, organisms involved) in a machine-readable fashion, so
that scientific results are easier to discover, unambiguously referenced and connected to particular scholars,


















Figure 2 – (a) Interpretation links features of the work (here: passages P1–3) to concepts in the reader’s
context of interpretations. (b) The contexts of interpretation of different readers may partly overlap (and
thus share associations) but may also have different relations and thus come to different interpretations of
the same work.
5 Case Study
Is it possible to model the temporal (and geographical) dynamics of the horizon of expectations? Let us
consider an example from music history to demonstrate our approach to computational hermeneutics.
In his review of a symphony by Robert Volkmann (which is little known today), Selmar Bagge wrote:
“Volkmann’s Dmoll-Symphonie ist eine durchaus pathetische Production” (AmZ 48, 1863, col. 806).
Suppose this sentence originated from a present-day source. In this case, a translation such as the following
would be perfectly possible: “Volkmann’s symphony in D minor is a quite emotive work”. However, since
a model of understanding contains assumptions about the author and the time of his or her writing, such
a translation would ignore that the German word pathetisch has undergone a significant semantic shift.
Today, pathetisch has a rather negative connotation and would thus have to be translated as ‘melodramatic’
or ‘pompous.’ To reveal the (historical) meaning likely to be intended by Bagge, we need to explore and
model the contexts in which pathetisch has been used. These contexts have to be distinguished according
to their distance to the target object of interpretation. Generally, an interpretation is more likely if it is
supported by sources that show proximity in terms of time and space. In other words, sources that have
been written around the same time and in the geographical vicinity of the source under investigation are
to be preferred over sources that show greater temporal and geographical distance. Both temporal and
geographical distances can best be modeled using network approaches (see above).
When consulting one central source, the approximately contemporaneous Deutsches Wörterbuch by
the Brothers Grimm, we find pathetisch glossed as ‘powerful,’ ‘dignified,’ or ‘solemn.’ In addition, the
word is linked to both the passionate and Schiller’s concept of the “pathetic-sublime” (1793). Both of
these usages are confirmed by much earlier sources: In Johann Georg Sulzer’s Allgemeine Theorie der
Schönen Künste (1793), the “pathetic” is considered a synonym of the “passionate.” In Heinrich Christoph
Koch’sMusikalisches Lexikon from 1802, the reader interested in the meaning of “patetico, pathetisch”
is directed to the entry on the “sublime” (Koch, 1802), thus suggesting that pathetisch and “sublime”
are synonyms. More distant 18th century sources even suggest an association of the sublime with the
“(delightful) horror.” Given the historical distance, this connotation is less likely to be conveyed in Bagge’s
statement. Considering this complex semantic history, the modeling task consists in (1) linking related
semantic concepts, (2) qualifying these links (e.g., as synonym, as super- and subcategory, or as semantic
overlap), and (3) weighing links according to temporal proximity.
The model reader that Bagge had in mind when making his statement about Volkmann’s symphony as
being pathetic is somebody who had a certain prior knowledge of that concept (as reconstructed from the
sources just mentioned). In addition to the semantic history of words, further contexts that need to be
considered concern a dense web of musical works. The prototypes of a pathetic work, as invoked by Bagge,
are Beethoven’s 5th and 9th symphonies. Readers of the time likely understood this to be the primary
context of Volkmann’s symphony without which a proper understanding could not be achieved. Further
works featuring “pathetic” in their titles are Beethoven’s piano sonata op. 13 and, much later, Tchaikovsky’s
6th symphony, the distance between these two works being roughly a hundred years. However, despite
the lack of a title, many earlier symphonies (by other composers) from the late 18th century on have
been referred to as invoking the “sublime,” and hence are “pathetic” in Koch’s sense. The reason for
Bagge’s aesthetic judgment thus lies in the shared musical properties of all the works contained in the set
of pathetic or sublime symphonies: the minor mode, the orchestral setting, a particular tempo, etc. As a
result, a hermeneutic reconstruction must consider both the semantic tradition (and change) of the word
“pathetic” and the corresponding musical production.
6 Conclusion: Implications and Prospects
As outlined at the outset of our paper, the humanities and the sciences are widely assumed to be separated
from each other by their respective methods, objects, and objectives. However, as suggested above, the
humanities and the sciences face a common challenge: both have to address explicitly the issues of
interpretation and decision-making under uncertainty. In particular, they need to formalize and model
the contexts of interpretation and the inferential processes under uncertainty, seeking to exploit the
rich potential of the computer as modeling machine (Piotrowski, 2019). The development of suitable
probabilistic tools (Pearl, 2000) for modeling network-like relationships between objects is a crucial task
for the whole scientific community, one that brings us closer to the ideal of a truly unified science.
The use of formalization and modeling is often met with a certain hostility in the humanities. Many
humanities scholars subscribe to the notion that interpretation can in principle never come to a conclusion,
and indeed the fascination of hermeneutics seems to lie in its inherent incompleteness. In addition, it
is assumed that multiple interpretations can exist alongside each other without the need (or even the
possibility) to prefer one over the other; this is in keeping with the cherished notion of plurality and
multiplicity of perspectives in the humanities. Yet exactly in this respect a computational approach may
offer obvious advantages, as the possibilities of formally representing interpretations, their contexts, and
the inference procedures allow scholars to better compare different interpretations and assign different
probability values to them (for applying a Bayesian approach to historiography and the problems of
assigning prior probabilities (see Tucker, 2004; Carrier, 2012). More generally, this approach can give
rise to the idea of progress in the humanities (something that is notoriously rejected by many humanities
scholars). Thus the essential challenge of the theoretical digital humanities is to come up with a convincing
approach to a “hermeneutic computer science” (West, 1997), whose tasks involves modeling interpretation
contexts, inferential processes, and uncertainty.
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